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Introduction
Many real-world markets are two-sided in the sense that potential participants care about the number of counterparts on the other side of the market. Transactions in such markets are often mediated through platforms. 1 It is well understood that the optimal pricing strategy of a provider of such a platform depends delicately on the precise nature and strength of the cross-group externality each side of the market is exerting on the other.
But how should the provider set prices if it is uncertain about these externalities and needs to estimate them from observed market outcomes?
Arguably, such uncertainty is an important feature of platform industries: a platform provider typically cannot perfectly foresee how strongly one side reacts to the number of users on the other side. When one side of the market are buyers and the other side are sellers, for example, uncertainty about the externalities reects uncertainty about some aspect of the buyer-seller relationship: the platform provider may be imperfectly informed about the sellers' production function or advertising technology, or about the buyers' demand function. In such a situation, the market outcome not only determines the platform provider's current prot but also yields information about the true externalities.
To the extent that the provider can inuence the information content of the market outcome through its choices, it may be worth its while sacricing some short-term prot so as to extract information that will be benecial in the long term.
The two-sidedness of a platform market renders this trade-o between earning and learning particularly interesting. To start with, changing the price on one side of the market will alter the level of participation and its information content on both sides. Any information extracted from market observations thus always comes as a blend of two signals, one from each side of the market. In turn, this raises the possibility that one and the same amount of information can be generated with very dierent price combinations.
Is is far from clear, therefore, how a forward-looking platform provider ought to adjust its prices relative to the myopic benchmark of current-prot maximization.
To shed some light on this dynamic pricing problem, we embed a standard model of two-sided monopoly markets into a canonical Bayesian learning framework. Like Armstrong (2006), we focus on participation decisions, with prices taking the form of access, membership or subscription fees.
2 Like Keller and Rady (1999) , we consider a continuoustime innite-horizon model in which there are two possible states of the world, the demand function on each side of the market is linear in either state, and observed demand is an imperfect signal of the true state because of additive Brownian noise.
3
The platform
Examples include payment systems (where shoppers will want to hold a card if many merchants accept it, while merchants will be willing to accept cards that many customers hold), game consoles (providing a platform for players and software developers), smart phones (users, application developers), nightclubs and matching agencies (men, women), news media (consumers, advertisers), shopping malls, trade fairs, B2C and B2B platforms (where buyers are interested in a large variety of oerings, and sellers in a large number of customers).
This framework has become the workhorse model in two-sided markets. A particular example are trade fairs where exhibitors pay stand rental fees and visitors entrance fees. The trade fair company as the platform provider has to decide on these prices in advance of any event; in particular, for new events the platform may face strong uncertainty as to the the strength of cross-group external eects which determine the value of interaction on each side of the platform.
! While the focus of Keller and Rady (1999) is on the eects of a changing state of the world on the learning dynamics, here we assume that the state is xed over time. In Peitz, Rady and Trepper (2011), we also analyze a scenario in which the platform provider selects quantities and learns from prices. This variant of the model turns out to be more tractable, but the price setting version is clearly more relevant provider is assumed to incur no costs, so that revenue and prot are synonymous.
In this framework, current revenues and the information content of observed participation levels are both quadratic functions of the two fees. This allows us to compute the myopic benchmark in closed form and to characterize the optimal pricing policy of a forward-looking platform provider by means of the linear rst-order conditions associated with the provider's Bellman equation. A familiar advantage of our stationary continuoustime setting is that, at any given belief about the state of the world, the provider's incentive to deviate from the myopic benchmark is entirely captured by a single number: the shadow price of information at this belief. 4 Even though in general there are no closed-form solutions for the value function and the shadow price, we can exploit this fact to derive qualitative predictions as to how the optimal fees will be adjusted relative to the myopic benchmark. In geometric terms, we are tracing out the locus of tangency points between iso-revenue and iso-information curves at the given belief; the higher is the shadow price of information, the farther along this locus we move, attaining higher quantities of information.
For low shadow prices of information, 5 the direction of price experimentation can be determined by a simple comparison between the slope of the iso-information curve through the myopically optimal fees and two numbers: the common slopes of all isorevenue curves along a horizontal and a vertical axis through these fees, respectively. This comparison already yields the important insight that, even if lowering either fee makes the market outcome more informative, uncertainty about the cross-group externalities may induce the platform provider to raise one fee above the myopic benchmark. In fact, while the two fees can be complements with respect to the quantity of information, they are always substitutes with respect to current revenue. A lower fee on one side of the market then makes reducing the fee on the other side more attractive from an informational perspective, but less attractive with respect to current revenue, and this second eect may well dominate.
The main part of the paper is concerned with analytical results on optimal price experimentation which do not rely on the shadow price of information being small. The most tractable scenario in our model is that of symmetric externalities, meaning that in both states of the world the externality one side exerts on the other is exactly as strong as the converse externality. Symmetric externalities neutralize each other completely in the sense that it becomes optimal for the platform provider to behave as if it were a monopolist in two unrelated markets. The revenue-maximizing fees are independent of the provider's beliefs, therefore, and there is no incentive to deviate from these fees.
The second most tractable scenario is that of one-sided externalities. This means that side A, say, benets from an increase in participation on side B, but side B does not benet from increased participation on side A. 6 In this scenario, the platform provider always in applications.
" This shadow price is the product of the subjective variance of the state of the world and the second derivative of the value function, divided by twice the interest rate. As usual in single-agent Bayesian learning problems of this kind, a non-negative value of information translates into a value function that is convex in beliefs, implying a non-negative shadow price of information. Another standard result is that the shadow price decreases in the interest rate.
# The shadow price is low if the platform provider is subjectively quite certain about the true state of the world, for example, or if the interest rate is high.
$ As an example, consider readers whose utility of a magazine is independent of the amount of advertising. As another example, consider a nightclub for heterosexual singles (men and women). Externalities are one-sided if people from one group go there for the music, while people from the other group are also sets a fee lower than the myopic optimum on side B, and a fee higher than the myopic optimum on side A. In fact, the only way to make the market outcome more informative is to raise participation on side B by lowering the fee there, giving the participants on both sides a larger surplus. As raising the fee on side A does not aect participation on side B, the provider can safely extract part of the extra surplus given to side A by charging it a fee above the myopic optimum.
The same intuition applies to the case of one-sided uncertainty where the externality exerted by side A is perfectly known but positive. Again, the platform provider can only increase the amount of information by lowering the fee on side B. Whether part of the extra surplus this creates on side A is extracted through a higher fee on that side now depends on a comparison of indirect price eects, however. If the responsiveness of expected participation on side A to price changes on side B (as measured by the absolute value of the relevant partial derivative) is higher than the responsiveness of expected participation on side B to price changes on side A, the platform provider will again raise the fee on side A.
Moving on two scenarios with uncertainty about both cross-group externalities, we distinguish between ordered and mixed price eects. We say that price eects are ordered if in one state of the world the responsiveness of expected participation on either side to a change in either fee is always at least as high as in the other state; otherwise we say that price eects are mixed. Price eects are ordered if the two cross-group externalities are positively correlated across states of the world. Price eects are mixed when the externalities are negatively correlated and the spread between the two possible externality parameters on each side is of similar size.
The scenarios described so far are all limiting cases of ordered price eects. Applying a standard continuity argument, we rst show that for approximately symmetric externalities, the platform provider always sets both fees below their myopically optimal levels.
Intuitively, the direction of experimentation must be the same on both sides in this case, and charging less than the myopic fee clearly makes the market outcome more informative. By the same continuity argument, a scenario of approximate one-sided uncertainty in which one externality is much better known than the other can give rise to a fee above the myopic optimum on one side of the market, with exactly the same intuition as above.
For ordered price eects more generally, we formulate sucient conditions which ensure fee adjustments of a particular sign. These conditions again have a natural interpretation in terms of the geometry of iso-revenue and iso-information curves. They point to asymmetries in the signal-to-noise ratios on the two sides of the market as another natural reason for fee increases on one side. If the spread between the two possible externality parameters is roughly the same on both sides but the level of noise is considerably smaller on side B, for example, there is more to be learned about the true state of the world by lowering the fee on side A. If the platform provider expects this to induce a suciently large increase in the surplus given to side B, it will raise the fee on that side above the myopically optimal level so as to capture part of the extra surplus.
It is straightforward to provide similar sucient conditions for mixed price eects.
We refrain from spelling them out in this paper and instead turn to the very tractable special case of antisymmetric externalities with the two sides being symmetric in all other regards.
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When the provider is highly uncertain about which side exerts the stronger interested in getting to know people of the opposite sex. % This includes the limiting case in which the platform provider knows that only one side of the market exerts an externality on the other, but does not know which side it is. externality, it charges both sides less than in the myopic benchmark; the intuition for this nding is the same as the one suggested for approximately symmetric externalities.
When the platform provider is fairly condent in knowing the side that exerts the stronger externality, it learns most eectively by lowering the fee on this side; whether it is optimal to recoup some of the surplus this creates by raising the fee on the other side then depends on the actual strength of the externality. By continuity, these ndings carry over to scenarios of approximate antisymmetry.
In the absence of closed-form solutions, we resort to numerical simulations when analyzing the impact of optimal experimentation on market participation, the dependence of optimal policies on the model parameters, and dynamic implications for prices and quantities. More precisely, we compute optimal policies in the undiscounted limit of our model, which provides a tight upper bound on the shadow price of information and hence corresponds to maximal experimentation. It is well known that these policies can be computed without solving for the value function rst. In fact, we show that the computation reduces to solving a quadratic equation in one unknown, albeit with coecients that are too cumbersome for analytical results.
Whenever the platform provider reduces both fees below the myopically optimal level, expected participation on both sides obviously increases whatever the true state of the world. In scenarios where the provider sets a fee above the myopically optimal level on one side, however, expected participation on this side may well decrease in some state.
What we see in numerical examples can be summarized as follows. Participation rises on a given side either when the externality exerted on this side is strong (so that any fee increase on this side is more than compensated by the concurrent fee reduction on the other), or when this externality is weak and the platform provider believes it is weak (so that the provider will refrain from raising the fee on this side). Participation falls on a given side when the externality exerted on this side is weak but the platform provider believes it is strong (and so raises the fee on this side in an attempt to capture some of the rents created by lowering the other fee).
Holding the externalities in one state of the world xed and changing those in the other state so that we move from symmetric externalities to one-sided uncertainty and eventually to antisymmetric externalities, we are gradually increasing the incentives to experiment in the sense that the revenue-maximizing fees become more and more sensitive to the true state of the world. In our numerical examples, this goes hand in hand with an increase in the extent of experimentation that takes place, involving ever larger deviations from the myopic benchmark. Changes in the model parameters can have a surprisingly strong eect on the slope and curvature of the optimal pricing policies, moreover.
This great variability in the shape of optimal policy functions gives rise to rich intertemporal patterns. An optimal fee can be decreasing and concave in beliefs over some part of the unit interval, for example, and increasing and convex over another part; by Ito's Lemma, the sign of the expected innitesimal change in the fee will depend on the current belief, therefore. In addition, the sample-path properties of prices and quantities can depend quite strongly on the true constellation of cross-group externalities. In one of our numerical illustrations with approximately antisymmetric externalities, for example, one of the fees is expected to rise both in the short and long run; this rise is fairly gentle on average in one state of the world, but involves drastic adjustments in the other.
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two dierent regimes when it comes to price dynamics. In the two-sided experimentation regime, consumers on both sides initially are charged lower fees than in the myopic benchmark, whereas in the experimentation and exploitation regime one side initially faces a higher fee. In either regime, a price path which starts at a lower fee and then rises more steeply on average amounts to introductory pricing with larger initial discounts for informational reasons.
8 Despite higher prices on one side for some time, our simulations suggest that experimentation tends to raise participation on both sides most of the time, which tends to benet the users of the platform. Moreover, experimentation can lead to a non-monotonic time trend in participation on one side, with increasing participation as beliefs move towards the middle of the unit interval where uncertainty is most pronounced, and declining participation as the platform provider becomes more condent of the true state of the world.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 considers the benchmark of myopic behaviour, and Section 5 describes the evolution of beliefs. Section 6 characterizes the optimal pricing policy and its limit as the platform provider becomes innitely patient.
Section 7 presents pricing implications. Section 8 discusses expected quantities, comparative statics and dynamic implications. Section 9 concludes. Auxiliary technical results and all proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Related Literature
Pricing strategies in two-sided markets have received a lot of attention in industrial economics. Seminal papers on two-sided markets are Tirole (2003, 2006) and Armstrong (2006) . For a theoretical investigation of media platforms see, in particular, Anderson and Coate (2005) . A general model of monopoly platforms is analyzed by Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl (2007) . Weyl (2010) proposes the alternative solution concept of insulating taris. Empirical work includes Rysman (2004) and Kaiser and Wright (2006) . For a selective survey of this literature, see Rysman (2009) ; a textbook treatment can be found in Belleamme and Peitz (2010) . None of the existing literature treats two-sided markets in a setting of uncertainty where it is unclear how strong the relevant externalities are, and where the platform provider might benet from experimenting with prices in order to learn about the true state of the world. Our contribution is to introduce uncertainty and learning into the set-up proposed by Armstrong (2006) . This allows us to analyze how the optimal price structure diers from the myopic benchmark and how it evolves over time. Our analysis suggests that markets characterized by cross-group externalities of uncertain size provide incentives for the experimenting platform provider to initially lower at least one price.
We are aware of one other contribution that embeds two-sided markets in a dynamic setting. Cabral (2011) considers a monopoly platform whose users can reassess their participation decisions with some probability in each period. He nds that the dynamic model may have a unique equilibrium even when the static pricing model exhibits multiple equilibria. He also shows that this setting can provide a dynamic foundation for the equilibrium concept of insulating taris proposed by Weyl (2010) .
The economics literature on optimal experimentation by a single Bayesian decision maker starts with the work of Prescott (1972) and Rothschild (1974) ; a survey of this literature can be found in Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) . Our contribution here is & An alternative explanation for introductory pricing in two-sided markets could be dynamic consumer behavior which might make a platform provider strive to build up a critical mass. We exclude this channel by assuming that participants can revise their participation decision in each period at no cost.
to extend the analysis of optimal experimentation to two-sided markets and, building upon the innite-horizon continuous-time model of Keller and Rady (1999) , to provide a tractable framework for it. Like in that model, the maximand in the Bellman equation is the sum of a concave quadratic (expected current revenue) and a convex quadratic (the shadow price of information times the quantity of information to be gathered from the market outcome). We make the novel observation that in the absence of any restrictions on the action space, the shadow price of information must be small enough to render the combined quadratic strictly convex. While there exists an action that leads to a completely uninformative market outcome, this action does not maximize expected revenues at any belief and hence is never chosen. In contrast to the Keller-Rady model with a xed state of the world, learning is thus always complete in the long run.
Closely related work on dynamic pricing problems with Brownian information is due to Välimäki (1997, 2002) and Bonatti (2011) . These authors study the introduction of a new product whose quality can be either high or low. Buyers and sellers learn about it by observing a statistic that aggregates the experience of all buyers. As the informativeness of this statistic increases with the mass of consumers who try the new product, a positive value of information translates into an incentive to set this product's price below the myopically optimal level. The causal chain from lower prices to higher participation levels to more informative market outcomes is also present in our model; in suciently asymmetric two-sided markets, however, it can be overturned by the incentive to extract surplus on a side that benets strongly from an experimentation-induced fee reduction on the other side.
Like the platform provider in our model, the monopolistic seller in Bonatti (2011) possesses multiple pricing instruments with which to pursue the conicting goals of exploitation and explorationone for each type or group of customers. In fact, this seller chooses a non-linear tari so as to screen consumers for their willingness to pay (second-degree price discrimination); dierent consumer groups are linked through incentive compatibility constraints. In our model, by contrast, the platform can identify to which group a consumer belongs and thus engages in group pricing (third-degree price discrimination); the two groups are linked through the external eects that they exert on each other. These eects are exogenous, and varying their strength allows for a rich analysis of the eects of uncertainty about them on market outcomes.
The Model
We propose a two-sided market model following Armstrong (2006) 
While the intrinsic values and the possible externality parameters are common knowledge, the state of the world is known to market participants, but not to the platform provider.
12 Actual participation is expected participation plus some noise term that will be specied below; this noise prevents the platform provider from learning θ instantly.
To understand the assumptions on cross-group externalities, we consider a two-sided platform which hosts buyers (side A) and sellers (side B). We postulate that buyers and sellers cannot bypass the platform, i.e., all trade takes place on the platform. After the participation decision, participating buyers and sellers interact, as we will specify in our In our specication, the indirect utility from cross-group externalities is linear in participation on the other side. The utility of participants is independent of participation on the own side. In terms of the underlying micro model of the buyer-seller interaction this means that the oers by sellers are totally dierentiated, i.e., a seller's demand for its product is independent of the pricing decisions of all other sellers.
Two special cases lead to such a demand structure: First, suppose that consumers have a quasi-linear utility function in the products potentially on oer at the platform and an outside good. Consumers view the dierent products as equally attractive, but independent, and thus have the same demand function D for each product.
Second, suppose that each consumer is interested in exactly one product among all the potential products, while she does not derive any utility from all other products. At the participation stage, consumers do not know which product they like (nor do the sellers know this). Consumers have a quasi-linear utility function in the product they like and an outside good. The platform operates as a matching platform and is able to perfectly match buyers and sellers, i.e., a buyer is matched to the seller whose product she likes whenever this product is available on the platform. If the buyer's net surplus from the successful match is u, her expected surplus is un B . The upper bound of the strength of the externality guarantees that the equilibrium at the participation stage is unique and stable.
Linearity obtains because of the uniform distribution of the value of the outside option. We implicitly assume that m is suciently large such that n A , n B < m.
We impose this for the sake of tractability. If side A, say, does not know the strength of the externality it exerts on the other side either, it has to form a belief about it. This, in turn, has to be taken into account by the platform provider who then must form a belief about the true strength of the externalities as well as about the belief of side A. We leave the analysis of such a model for future work. In the present set-up, only the platform provider holds beliefs and learns. 
The values of the four parameters of our model are thus e
Example 2: Consider the same setting as in Example 1, but let us postulate that each monopoly seller sets a price P per unit of output.
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The buyer's demand function is assumed to be log-concave where positive. Then, at the participation stage, buyers and sellers rationally anticipate that each seller solves
. Example 3: Instead of the platform facing uncertainty about the sellers' marginal cost, it may face aggregate demand uncertainty. Suppose that demand is described by a state
are assumed to be log-concave where positive. The realization of the demand state is learnt by buyers and sellers. They rationally anticipate that each seller solves
The values of the four parameters of our model are thus e In these examples, sellers set the product price. It is straightforward to generate additional examples where, in addition to setting price, sellers invest in advertising or product ! We implicitly assume that the platform either cannot observe the price or, if it does, cannot draw inferences on u and π because it does not understand the buyer-seller interaction.
quality. For instance, sellers may use advertising as a complement as in Becker and Murphy (1993) , and the platform is uncertain about the sellers' advertising technology.
Alternatively, sellers may invest in product quality, and the platform faces uncertainty with respect to the sellers' investment cost function.
With these simple micro-foundations in place, we return to the stage at which users make their participation decisions. As the product e 1 − e For reasons that will become clear very soon, we refrain from imposing a non-negativity constraint on expected participation and interpret the system (3)(4) as describing participation decisions for any prices (M A , M B ). In other words, we allow the platform provider to charge arbitrarily high fees. Arbitrarily low fees are unproblematic, by contrast, since negative fees have a natural interpretation as subsidies for participation.
In every period t ∈ [0, ∞[ , the platform provider sets prices (M 
with t = 0, ∆t, 2∆t, . . . and ε i t ∼ IIN(0, 1). They capture the idea that consumers make occasional mistakes or experience taste shocks that are correlated across consumers and independent over time, either of which are not observed by the other side. Alternatively, these equations can be interpreted to include noise traders on each side of the market, who participate or stay away for reasons unrelated to those captured in equations (1)(2).
Working with normal noise distributions keeps the updating of the platform provider's beliefs tractable; at the same time, their full support implies a positive probability for observed quantity increments and cumulative quantities to be negativeeven if the latter do increase in expectation. In line with the literature, 14 we accept this weakness of the Brownian framework for the sake of tractability. This in turn is the reason why we do not insist on expected quantity increments being non-negative at each instant.
15
The platform provider's revenue increment from fees (M
.
We normalize platform costs to zero and denote the probability that the platform provider initially assigns to state θ = 1 by p 0 , assuming that this prior belief is non-degenerate, i.e., 0 < p 0 < 1. Hence, the platform provider's total expected prots (expressed in per-period terms) are
where r > 0 is the discount rate. By the martingale property of the stochastic integral with respect to Brownian motion, this expectation reduces to
Let p t be the subjective probability that the platform provider assigns to state θ = 1 at time t. Invoking the law of iterated expectations, we can rewrite total expected prots as
where
is the expected current revenue from charging the fees (M A , M B ) given the belief p.
The Myopic Benchmark
If the platform provider were myopic (corresponding to r = ∞), it would maximize expected current revenue at each instant. Under our parameter restrictions, this revenue is strictly concave in (M A , M B ), so the myopically optimal fees,
are uniquely determined by the (linear) rst-order conditions.
To compute these fees, we write the expected quantities appearing on the right-hand side of (6) as
measures the expected direct and indirect eect, respectively, of lowering M A or M B given the belief p. We note that 0 ≤ ℓ i (p) < ℓ 0 (p) for i = A, B and all p. In the following, it will be convenient to write ℓ
With the dependence on the belief p suppressed, the expected current revenue associated with the fees (M A , M B ) now becomes
and the rst-order conditions yield the myopically optimal fees
As is well known from the literature on two-sided markets, the myopically optimal fee on one side of the market depends on market characteristics on both sides. For future reference, we denote the myopically optimal revenue by
and note that, as the upper envelope of linear functions (one for each xed pair of fees), R µ is convex.
The Evolution of Beliefs
The platform provider revises its beliefs over time. We dene
As the sum of squares of linear functions, S is convex.
Lemma 1 The platform provider's beliefs evolve according to
Any pricing policy for which
is bounded away from 0 induces complete learning in the long run: as t → ∞ the belief p t almost surely converges to 1 if the true state of the world is (e measures the information content of the demand observations obtained after setting prices (it is the sum of the squared signal-to-noise ratios of these observations).
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The more informative the observations are, the more strongly the beliefs react to them. If the information content is bounded away from zero, the continuous accrual of information ensures that the truth is learnt eventually. In particular, this is the case for the myopically optimal pricing policy. 17 We shall see shortly that an optimal policy generates no less information than the myopic one, and hence gives rise to complete learning as well.
An explicit expression for the function S and a more detailed discussion of its properties can be found in Appendix A.2. Here, we just note that for e 
Arguing exactly as in Keller and Rady (1997 We can interpret the second term of the maximand in the Bellman equation as the value of information, given by the product of the (non-negative) shadow price of information,
and the quantity of information, S(M A , M B ). When V = 0, the value of information is zero, and the platform provider chooses the myopically optimal prices. When V > 0, the platform provider experiments, i.e., deviates from the myopic strategy so as to increase the information content of its demand observations. As a consequence, any optimal pricing policy has S(M The maximand in (10) is the sum of two quadratic functions, one of them strictly concave (expected current revenue), the other convex (value of information). As the value function is bounded, and as fees are unbounded above and below, the shadow price $ If the platform provider were uncertain about the intrinsic platform values (v A , v B ) instead of the externalities (e A , e B ), the quantity of information would be independent of the fees charged. The platform provider would then trivially always set the myopically optimal fees.
for all p because the latter fees generate an expected current revenue of zero and marginally lowering one fee would improve upon that.
of information must be small enough for the combined quadratic to be bounded above and hence concave. 18 In fact, we can prove strict concavity.
Lemma 2 Evaluated at the platform provider's value function, the maximand in the Bellman equation (10) These algebraic expressions are closely linked to the geometry of iso-revenue and isoinformation curves. To see this, it is useful to think of the platform provider as following a two stage-procedure. At the rst stage, it determines the combination of fees that maximizes the quantity of information subject to the constraint that a certain current expected revenue be achieved. This amounts to identifying the points of tangency between iso-information and iso-revenue curves in the (M A , M B )-plane; their locus is a curve that can be parameterized by the shadow price of information, starting at the myopically optimal fees for V = 0 and moving away from the the myopic optimum as V increases.
At the second stage, the provider chooses a point on this locus; it is at this stage that the precise value of V comes into play.
To understand the direction in which this locus leaves the myopic optimum, it is instructive to study the explicit expressions in Appendix A. optimum is atter than the iso-revenue curve through this point, and the platform provider can increase both revenue and information by reducing M B . We know from Section 4 that −ℓ 0 /ℓ AB < −1 < −ℓ AB /ℓ 0 . At small shadow prices of information, it is thus optimal to set both fees below their myopically optimal levels when
however, it is optimal to set one fee above the myopic optimum. Figure 1 illustrates the three scenarios that can arise this way.
Thus, even if lowering either fee increases the quantity of information, the uncertainty about the externalities between the two sides of the market may induce a learning platform & If we had imposed a non-negativity constraint on the expected quantities (3)(4), the situation would be more complicated. Given the smaller choice set, the shadow price of information would be higher. The combined quadratic could then possess a saddle-point and be strictly increasing towards the boundaries of the set of admissible fee combinations. provider to raise one fee. In fact, a lower fee on one side of the market makes reducing the fee on the other side more attractive from an informational perspective (the crosspartial derivative of the quantity of information with respect to prices is positive for the parameters underlying Figure 1 ), but less attractive as far as expected current revenue is concerned (its cross-partial derivative is always negative). The second eect dominates in Figures 1(a) and 1(c) .
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For shadow prices V further away from zero, the expressions for the optimal fees are harder to analyze, but we shall see in the following section that they nevertheless allow us to investigate (and explain in economic terms) the directions of optimal experimentation without precise knowledge of the value function, simply treating V as a parameter.
As to the possible extent of optimal experimentation, we can provide a tight upper bound on the shadow price of information. For this purpose, we write the Bellman 
Arguing as in Keller and Rady (1997, Theorem 5.2 and Appendix E.1), one shows that the value v(p) is decreasing in r at all p in the open unit interval, and that it converges to the ex ante full-information pay-o
as r ↓ 0. This in turn means that the shadow price of information V (p) increases monotonically to
as the platform provider becomes more and more patient. Intuitively speaking, the lower the platform provider's discount rate, the greater is its incentive to deviate from the myopic optimum. The shadow price of information, as a measure of this incentive, is thus maximal for r = 0; for any positive discount rate, we have 0 ≤ V < V on the open unit interval.
The transformed Bellman equation (11) further implies that for r ↓ 0, the optimal fees
which is the optimal policy of a platform provider maximizing its undiscounted transient payo, that is, total expected revenue net of the full-information payo that it will obtain in the long run; see Bergemann and Välimäki (1997) or Bolton and Harris (2000) for details on this performance criterion. We will refer to (M A , M B ) as the maximal experimentation strategy, reecting the fact that these fees mark the largest deviation from the myopic optimum.
Besides its important role in delineating the possible range of experimentation, the maximal experimentation strategy has the great advantage of being algebraically computable. In the discounted problem, computing the maximum in the Bellman equation 
Pricing Implications
Our next aim is to provide results on optimal price experimentation which do not require the shadow price of information to be small in the sense of the local analysis performed in the previous section. As these results depend crucially on the precise nature of the externalities which the two sides of the market exert on each other, we are lead to consider a number of dierent scenarios, starting with the most tractable ones.
Symmetric Externalities
When the externality that side A exerts on side B is exactly as strong as the converse externality in either state of the world, then the myopic pricing strategy is optimal. In fact,
for (e The case of symmetric externalities is actually the only one in which the myopically optimal revenue R µ is linear in beliefs. In all other cases, this function is strictly convex, and so is the value function v, implying a positive shadow price of information.
One-Sided Externalities
The second most tractable scenario in our model is the one where e The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Lowering the fee on side B not only makes the participation observed on side A more informative, but also gives the participants on that side a larger surplus. As raising the fee on side A does not aect participation on side B, the provider can safely extract part of the extra surplus given to side A by charging it a fee above the myopic optimum.
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The maximal experimentation policy takes a particulary simple form in this case. The
To make the connection with our earlier analysis for small shadow prices of information, note that where e A (p) = pe
Comparing these fees to the myopically optimal ones, we rst see that
As R(p) = p R µ (1)+(1−p)R µ (0) and R µ is strictly convex, the right-hand side is negative for 0 < p < 1. Thus, in line with Proposition 2, the maximal experimentation policy will indeed decrease the fee that generates information. On the other side of the market, we
so for non-degenerate beliefs, there is a price increase relative to the myopic benchmark, which is again in line with Proposition 2.
One-Sided Uncertainty
Our next step is to analyze the scenario where the externality exerted by side A is perfectly known, but positive.
Proposition 3 The intuition for this result is closely related to that for Proposition 2. When the externality exerted by side A is known, the platform provider can only increase the amount of information by lowering the fee on side B. Side A then benets from higher participation on side B. When ℓ A > ℓ B , the price eect that side A is expected to have on side B is weaker than the price eect in the other direction, and the platform provider can again extract part of the additional surplus given to side A by charging this side a higher fee. Figure 2 illustrates the two situations that can arise for a known externality parameter e B . Iso-information curves are parallel straight lines with slope −e B . In Figure 2 (a), the locus of tangency points between iso-revenue curves and iso-information lines is an upward sloping line the optimal trade-o between information and current revenue induces a decrease in both fees. In Figure 2(b) , the locus of tangency points is a downward sloping line; here, the trade-o between information and current revenue leads to a decrease in M B but an increase in M A .
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Proposition 3 implies in particular that for a known externality parameter e B < e 0 A , the platform provider always sets a fee above the myopic optimum on side A, exactly as in the case where e B = 0. For e B > e 1 A , it lowers both fees relative to the myopic benchmark. 
Ordered Price Eects
We now turn to scenarios with two-sided uncertainty, meaning that e 1 B ̸ = e 0 B . In these scenarios, the platform provider can manipulate the information content of observed participation on both sides, and can do so by varying either fee.
To make progress on this problem, we rst restrict the model parameters in a way that encompasses the three scenarios analyzed so far (symmetry, one-sided externalities and one-side uncertainty) as limiting cases. We say that price eects are ordered if the direct and indirect eects of lowering either fee are at least as strong in state θ = 1 as in state θ = 0; otherwise we say that price eects are mixed. As our standing assumptions imply ℓ , the optimal fee on side A exceeds its myopic benchmark at beliefs close to 1, while the fee on side B is always below its myopically optimal level. This result is illustrated in Figure 4 . The intuition here is essentially the same as for Proposition 3. If the externality exerted by side A is subject to moderate uncertainty only, the platform provider optimally experiments by lowering the fee on side B. And when the price eect that side A is expected to have on side B is weaker than the price eect in the other direction, the platform provider again extracts surplus from side A by charging it a higher fee. If e Proposition 6 Suppose that price eects are ordered. Consider a belief p for which both myopically optimal fees are lower than the respective intrinsic values. Then, the platform provider lowers the fee on side A relative to the myopically optimal level if
and raises it if
Similarly, the platform provider lowers the fee on side B relative to the myopically optimal level if
It is straightforward to give a geometric intuition for conditions (14)(17) in terms of iso-revenue and iso-information curves in the (M A , M B )-plane. We have already seen that the slope of the iso-revenue curve through any point on the vertical line segment
shows that the slope of the iso-information curve through any point on the line segment
elliptic shape of the iso-information curves implies that the slope of the iso-information curve through any point on L µ A is strictly smaller than −s AB /s B . Under condition (14), this in turn is strictly smaller than −ℓ AB /ℓ 0 , so in each point on L µ A the iso-information curve declines more steeply than the iso-revenue curve and, exactly like in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), the platform provider can raise both its expected revenue and the information content of observed participation by setting M A below its myopically optimal level.
Similarly, the slope of the iso-information curve through any point on the line segment
elliptic shape of the iso-information curves implies that the slope of the iso-information curve through any point on L µ A is strictly larger than −s A /s AB . Under condition (15), this in turn is strictly larger than −ℓ AB /ℓ 0 , so in each point on L µ A the iso-information curve declines less steeply than the iso-revenue curve and, as in Figure 1(c) , the platform provider can raise both its expected revenue and the information content of observed participation by setting M A above its myopically optimal level.
In an analogous manner, conditions (16) and (17) translate into inequalities between the slopes of the iso-revenue and iso-information curves along the line segment L
Note that conditions (15) and (17) (14) is met at a beliefp, therefore, it will be met at all p <p. The reason for this is straightforward: a lower p implies a atter iso-revenue curve and thus makes it`cheaper' (in terms of expected revenue) to lower the fee on side A for informational purposes. By the same line of argument, (16) also becomes easier to satisfy as p decreases, while (15) and (17) become harder to satisfy. Thus, a sucient condition for uniformly lower fees on both sides of the market is that (14) and (16) both hold at p = 1, and a sucient condition for a uniformly higher fee on one side is that either (15) or (17) hold at p = 0.
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As the left-hand sides of (14) and (16) In such a situation, there is more to be learned from lowering the fee on side A. Given enough condence in the state θ = 1, this is expected to have a comparatively strong eect on the surplus given to side B and hence makes it optimal to charge this side a fee above the myopically optimal level.
Mixed Price Eects
The sucient conditions in Proposition 6 also apply to scenarios with mixed price eects When the platform provider is highly uncertain about which side exerts the stronger externality, that is, when the belief is close to 1/2, both sides are charged less than in the myopic benchmark. The intuition for this nding is the same as the one suggested for approximately symmetric externalities (see Proposition 4): given that the fees charged to the two sides must be close to each other, the direction of experimentation must be the same on both sides, and charging less than the myopic optimum makes observed participation unambiguously more informative. For beliefs near a boundary of the unit interval, on the other hand, the platform provider is fairly condent in knowing the side that exerts the stronger externality on the other (if p is close to 1, say, this is side B), and learns most eectively by lowering the fee on this side; whether it is optimal to recoup some of the surplus this creates by raising the fee on the other side (side A for p close to 1) depends on the actual strength of the externality.
By the same continuity argument as in the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5, these ndings carry over qualitatively to scenarios of approximate antisymmetry where (e Figures 3 and 4 , so knowing the true state of the world matters much more for optimal pricing. We shall return to this issue when we discuss how the optimal pricing strategy depends on the parameters of the model.
Further Findings

Implications for Quantities
If the platform provider reduces both fees below the myopically optimal level, expected participation on both sides increases irrespectively of the true state of the world. By Proposition 4, this is the case for approximately symmetric externalities.
In scenarios where the platform provider sets a fee above the myopically optimal level on one side, however, expected participation on this side may well decrease in some state of the world. This phenomenon is barely visible in the lower left panel of Figure 6 , computed 
with the same model parameters as Figure 4 (approximately one-sided uncertainty). In state θ = 0, the externality exerted on side A is considerably weaker than the externality exerted on side B, so when the platform provider raises the fee on side A at high beliefs p, the ensuing negative eect on the participation on side A is not fully compensated by the positive eect of a lower fee on side B. In state θ = 1, by contrast, the externality exerted on side A is considerably stronger than the externality exerted on side B, and the positive eect on n A of lowering M B more than compensates the negative eect of raising M A . In either state, nally, the comparatively large decrease in M B raises expected participation on side B at all non-degenerate beliefs.
For approximately antisymmetric externalities, decreases in expected participation occur on either side of the market; see Figure 7 , which has been computed with the same parameters as Figure 5 . On side A, the situation is qualitatively the same as in the example of approximate one-sided uncertainty that we just discussed, and can be explained in exactly the same way; side B is essentially its mirror image with the roles of the two states reversed.
In summary, participation rises on a given side either when the externality exerted on this side is strong, or when this externality is weak and the platform provider believes it is weak; participation falls on a given side when the externality exerted on this side is weak but the platform provider believes it is strong and thus raises the fee on this side in an attempt to capture some of the surplus created by lowering the other fee.
Comparative Statics
Inspection of the Bellman equation (10) shows that a multiplication of the noise intensities σ A and σ B by a common factor γ has the same eect as a multiplication of r by γ 2 . By the results mentioned in Section 6, for γ < 1 we obtain a higher value v at all non-degenerate beliefs, and a higher shadow price of information V ; by a standard monotone comparative statics argument, this in turn implies a higher quantity of information S at the optimal fees and a lower expected current revenue R. How the optimal fees themselves change in response to this parameter change has been explored in Section 7: whenever the results there imply an unambiguous direction of price experimentation for the fee on a given side, this fee will change further in that direction.
The picture becomes less clear when we change only one noise intensity. By the same comparison argument as in Keller and Rady (1997, Theorem 5.2 and Appendix E.1), a decrease in σ A , say, again leads to an increase in the value function, but the eect on the shadow price of information can no longer be signed unambiguously because
/S is increasing in both σ A and v. In the undiscounted limit, the situation is simpler: the maximal shadow price of information V clearly rises as σ A or σ B falls. As Figure 8 shows, such a parameter change can have a surprisingly strong eect on optimal fees and participation levels. In each panel, the leftmost curve is associated with σ B = 1, and hence the same as in Figure 5 and Figure 7 , respectively; as σ B decreases to 0.5 and 0.33, the curves shift to the right and exhibit steeper slopes. A reduction in σ B improves the signal-to-noise ratio in observed participation on side B and increases the marginal informational benet of reducing the fee on side A. As a consequence, the platform provider lowers M A at any non-degenerate belief. In turn, this increases the extra surplus given to side B, so M B is raised by successively more and over It is a plausible conjecture that higher incentives for experimentation imply more 
Dynamic Implications
Relative to the platform provider's information ltration, the process of beliefs (p t ) t≥0 is a diusion without drift (Lemma 1). For any twice dierentiable function f on the unit interval, the transformed process (f (p t )) t≥0 is again a diusion, and its drift coecient is of the same sign as f ′′ (p t ) by Ito's Lemma. Relative to the information ltration of an outsider who knows the true state of the world, the process of beliefs has an upward drift if θ = 1, and a downward drift if θ = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 1); by Ito's Lemma, the drift of the transformed process with respect to this ltration depends on both f ′ (p t ) and f ′′ (p t ). In view of the complicated structure of the optimal fees and the implied participation levels, it seems exceedingly dicult to determine the signs of their rst and second derivatives with respect to the belief in general, even in the undiscounted limit.
In fact, the slope and curvature of the myopically optimal fees already depend in a rather complicated fashion on the intrinsic values and externality parameter. In Figure Nevertheless, a few robust statements can be made about the dynamics of beliefs, optimal fees and resulting participation levels. Following Bergemann and Välimäki (1997) , # To our knowledge, no conjecture of this type has been proved yet, not even for simpler situations such as a standard monopoly pricing problem with just one decision variable and one outcome process.
In the present model, such a proof seems completely out of reach. we compute an estimatep t of the posterior belief p t in a given state of the world by numerically solving the belief dynamics under the maximal experimentation strategy without the stochastic component, focusing on expected innitesimal changes only. We then evaluate the maximal experimentation strategy and the induced participation levels along the path of estimated beliefs. We do so for the state θ = 1 in which, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, the belief estimate evolves according to dp
We take p 0 = 0.2 as the platform provider's prior belief and hence the initial condition forp.
The path ofp t exhibits the S-shape familiar from Bergemann and Välimäki (1997), rst rising slowly, then rapidly, then slowly again as it converges monotonically to 1.
Convergence is faster under the maximal experimentation strategy than under the my- 
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A couple of dynamic pricing implications emerge from this gure. Note that a myopic platform has an on average increasing price path on one side of the market and a decreasing one on the other. If the platform is forward-looking, fees converge more quickly to their full information limits. We also know from Section 7 that for any given belief about the state of the world, either one or both fees are below their myopically optimal levels.
This gives rise to price dynamics that fall into one of two regimes; which regime prevails depends on the conguration of externality parameters and initial beliefs.
In what we call the two-sided experimentation regime, the forward-looking platform initially sets lower fees on both sides of the market than a myopic platform would; see the illustrations with approximate symmetry and approximately one-sided uncertainty in Figure 9 . Then any price path that is on average increasing under myopic pricing is initially steeper under forward-looking pricing. In the example of approximately onesided uncertainty, moreover, a fully informed platform subsidizes side B and monetizes on side A because side A benets more strongly from participation on side B. With uncertainty about the state of the world, this subsidization is larger, and the surplus extraction starts earlier, if the platform is forward-looking rather than myopic.
In the other regime, only one fee is below the myopic level at the initial belief. We call this the experimentation and exploitation regime; see the illustration with approximate antisymmetry in Figure 9 . Since in the illustration we start with a prior belief p 0 close to zero, over time the platform changes its assessment as to which side exerts the stronger externality. Therefore, fees are initially lower on side A and end up being larger; this holds both for the myopic and the forward-looking platform. However, this inversion of the price structure occurs at considerably higher speed if the platform is forward-looking.
To summarize, while in the two-sided experimentation regime consumers on both sides initially are charged lower fees if the platform is forward-looking rather than myopic, in the experimentation and exploitation regime one side initially faces a higher fee. In either regime, an initially steeper and increasing price path amounts to introductory pricing & The dashed curves in this gure are generated by solving dp with larger initial discounts. In all three examples, despite higher prices on one side for some time, participation is larger on both sides if the platform is forward-looking instead of myopic, whenever this dierence in participation is pronounced. This tends to benet participants.
We further note that experimentation can cause the trend in expected participation to be non-monotonic over time. As larger quantities facilitate learning, the forward-looking platform induces particularly high participation levels when the uncertainty about the environment is highest, that is, once beliefs have moved towards the centre of the unit interval; it lets participation levels decline again when it has become fairly condent of the true state of the world.
Performing the same simulations for θ = 0 (and an initial belief p 0 = 0.8, say) generates exactly the same insights. If we consider the example in Figure 8 with σ B = 0.33, however, we nd an interesting dierence across the two states of the world. A platform provider starting with the prior belief p 0 = 0.5 expects M A to rise both in the short and in the long term. If the true state is θ = 0, this price increase will be very gentle in expectation. If the true state is θ = 1, by contrast, M A is expected to rise very quickly when the posterior belief is about 0.85; the associated changes in M B , n A and n B are equally drastic. Experimentation can thus make the variability of prices and quantities along their estimated paths markedly higher in one state than in the other.
Conclusion
We have studied a monopolistic platform provider in a two-sided market who is uncertain about the strength of interaction between the two sides. Maximizing expected lifetime prots, the platform provider faces the basic trade-o between the conicting aims of maximizing current payo and maximizing the information content of the market outcome.
How this trade-o is resolved depends crucially on the precise conguration of cross-group externalities. In particular, the platform provider may raise the fee on one side of the market so as to extract some of the surplus created by the experimentation-induced fee reduction on the other side.
Our model was set in continuous time and allowed the platform provider to adjust the price structure at any moment. In reality, for contractual or other reasons, platforms tend to change prices rather infrequently. We conjecture that the static and dynamic implications of optimal experimentation would be the same in a setting that incorporated such restrictions.
Our analysis concerns a monopoly platform. Future work may want to look at markets with multiple dierentiated platforms. As a starting point, it would be interesting to analyze duopoly experimentation in a two-sided market in which there is single-homing on both sides and full observability of actions and outcomes. In such a duopoly, a participant acquired by one platform provider is a participant lost for the competitor. Owing to cross-group externalities, this makes demand more sensitive to price changes than demand in the monopoly setting with a xed outside option that has been analyzed in this paper. Therefore, one may conjecture that gaining information about the strength of the externalities becomes more important. As has been pointed out in the literature on duopoly experimentation (e.g., Mirman et al. 1994 , Harrington 1995 , Keller and Rady 2003 , however, the public information generated by market signals may have a negative value, in which case the duopolists have an incentive to generate less information than in the myopic equilibrium.
Suppose, for instance, that market participation is perfectly price-inelastic, as is the case in the Hotelling-type model introduced by Armstrong (2006) . Then, learning does not increase future equilibrium prots in expectation because prots are linear in beliefs.
Since deviations from the myopic best response are costly, we conjecture that patient platform operators do not behave dierently from innitely impatient ones, and learn only passively. The duopoly setting merits further, more general investigation, and it would be interesting to understand the eect of the degree of dierentiation on experimentation in a two-sided market.
Another interesting extension is to consider a market for two (or more) goods that are complements. Specically, suppose that demands are linked through positive network eects. Here we have in mind a situation in which a monopolist sells a product (or technologically related products) to two distinct and distinguishable consumer groups. If consumers in each group care directly or indirectly about the sum of the total number of buyers in both groups (e.g., because a larger production volume increases average product quality through learning-by-doing), we can rewrite this as a demand system with within-group and cross-group externalities. Thus our analysis can possibly be extended to capture experimentation in markets with complementary goods.
Appendix
A.1 Auxiliary Results for the Expected Current Revenue R
Suppressing the dependence on p and other variables, we rewrite the expected current revenue as
A straightforward application of the implicit-function theorem now shows that the slope of the iso-revenue curve at the fee combination
] .
In particular, we see that
Finally, a simple computation shows that the derivative of the ratio ℓ 0 /ℓ AB with respect to p has the same sign as −(e 1 A − e 0 A ) − (e 1 B − e 0 B ). So this ratio is either decreasing in p or constant.
A.2 Auxiliary Results for the Quantity of Information S
We rst note that
where 
Next, we compute
with the constants
The coecient s A is a measure of how fast the marginal informational gain from lowering the fee M A increases as M A falls; it has two components, the rst pertaining to demand observations on side A, the second to demand observations on side B. 
A.3 The Optimal Fees
Suppressing the dependence on p, we write
for the quantity of information at the myopically optimal fees and
for the corresponding partial derivatives; as
, at least one of these derivatives is dierent from 0. The quantity of information can now be rewritten as
Combined with equation (A.1), this yields the following representation for the maximand R+V S in the Bellman equation (10):
The rst-order conditions are
The determinant of the Hessian matrix of R + V S is 4h(V ) where
The optimal pair of fees is the unique solution to the system (A.3)(A.4):
can be computed as
Inserting the expressions for S 
A.4 The Maximal Experimentation Strategy A.5 Proofs Proof of Lemma 1: Given a pair of prices (M A , M B ), the observed quantity increments are
θ).
Given the subjective probability p currently assigned to the state (e 1 A , e 1 B ), the vector of expected demands is ( According to Liptser and Shiryayev (1977) , the innitesimal change in beliefs is given by dp = p
is the increment of a standard two-dimensional Brownian motion relative to the platform provider's information ltration. Simplifying the expression for dp, we obtain dp = p(1 − p)(n A − n A )σ
Relative to the platform provider's information ltration, dẐ A and dẐ B are normally distributed with mean zero and variance dt, and the innitesimal covariance < dẐ A , dẐ B > is zero, so the change in beliefs dp is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
Now consider a pricing policy with S(M A , M B ) bounded away from 0, and suppose that the true state is θ = 1. As
we see that relative to the information ltration of an outside observer who knows the true state of the world, dp is normally distributed with mean
As this is strictly positive on ]0, 1[ , the process of beliefs is a submartingale with respect to the observer's ltration and, if started at a non-degenerate prior, almost surely converges to its upper bound 1 as t → ∞. An analogous argument establishes convergence to 0 when the true state is θ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: We x a non-degenerate belief p. In Section 6, we saw that R + V S is at least weakly concave in ( 
with all numerators and denominators being dierent from zero. In particular, the inequality ℓ 0 − s A V > 0 holds in this case as well.
As h(0) = ℓ 2 0 − ℓ 2 AB > 0 and h(ℓ 0 /s A ) ≤ 0, the function h has exactly one root in the interval ]0, ℓ 0 /s A ]. We denote it byV . Now, recall from Section 6 that V is strictly decreasing in the interest rate r. If there were an r > 0 such that V =V , then we would have V >V and h(V ) < 0 for all interest rates smaller than r, which contradicts what was said in the rst two paragraphs of this proof. We can thus conclude that h(V ) > 0 for all r > 0. This inequality is easily seen to hold for all (e 0 , e 1 ) with 0 ≤ e 0 < e 1 < 1.
Proof of Proposition
Proof of Proposition 5: We know from the proof of Proposition 3 that for e 0 B = e 1 B , the expression in curly brackets in (A.6) is negative and bounded away from 0 on the unit interval, while the expression in curly brackets in (A.5) is of the same sign as ℓ A − ℓ B . The result thus follows by continuous dependence of the value function and its second derivative on (e 0 B , e 1 B ). 
